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AUDIT PRICING IN A REFORMED NONPROFIT MARKET 
 
ABSTRACT 
In contrast to the extant research on audit fees of for-profit companies, literature on nonprofit 
audit fees is scant. In this paper, audit fee determinants of previous research are tested in a 
nonprofit market that is characterized by a relatively low dominance of BIG4 auditors, low 
litigation risk, small nonprofit entities, high levels of subsidization and recent legislative 
reforms. Using OLS on a sample of nonprofit entities, we find that some known determinants 
such as auditor size and client complexity hold their ground. However, our findings on client 
profitability and auditor industry specialization show that refinements of audit fee models 
need to incorporate audit market characteristics, agency problems and signaling. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit organizations worldwide are confronted with increased demand for accountability. 
External financial auditing by an independent expert is essential in safeguarding the quality 
and usefulness of financial reports. Given the expected relationship between audit quality and 
audit pricing, a vast amount of research explored the determinants of the fees paid to the audit 
firm since the influential work by Simunic (1980).Whereas most of the studies focused on the 
private sector and particularly on listed companies, the growing demand for accountability in 
the public and nonprofit sector set a new stream of research in motion. Auditing in the public 
sector has been on the research agenda since the 1980’s (Baber, Brooks & Ricks, 1987; 
Basioudis & Ellwood, 2005; Clatworthy, Mellett & Peel, 2002; Ward, Elder & Kattelus, 
1994). Nonprofit organizations seem to be the next in line to be confronted with stringent 
financial reporting regulation and the obligation of external auditing of these reports. Studies 
on audit fees in universities (Mellett, Peel & Karbhari, 2007) and charities (Beattie, Goodacre, 
Pratt & Stevenson, 2001) in the UK, identified determinants of audit fees in these specific 
submarkets. A recent study of 125 very large nonprofit organizations in the US expands these 
results by investigating the effect of resource dependence, internal control and governance 
mechanisms, as well as by leaving the boundaries of a specific subsector (Vermeer, 
Raghunandan & Forgione, 2009).  
 
In this paper, we investigate audit fees of nonprofit organizations in a specific market setting 
where (i) external financial reporting and external auditing have only recently been made 
mandatory, (ii) the auditor market is not characterized by a BIG4 dominance and (iii) the 
nonprofit organizations are relatively small (compared to previous research) and characterized 
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by high levels of subsidization. We draw on Belgian data to address two research questions. 
First, we want to develop a model for nonprofit audit fees in order to determine whether 
known determinants of audit fees in the for-profit sector are also reflected in nonprofit audit 
fees. As Tate (2007) points out, even in a well-established, mature audit market, there are 
significant differences between external auditing in a nonprofit and a for-profit setting. 
Dissimilarities in organizational structure, culture, goals, financial concerns, stakeholders and 
risk imply diversity in the way audit clients and auditors experience the audit process. Second, 
we want to investigate whether dependence on government subsidies is related to audit fees. 
Does subsidization increase audit complexity and demand for audit quality which are both 
reflected in the audit fee? 
This paper differs from previous research in three ways. First, the characteristics of the audit 
market are significantly different from those in earlier nonprofit research (low dominance of 
BIG4 auditors, low litigation risk, small client size and low commercial risk). Second, since 
recent legislative changes and existing differences between for-profit and nonprofit clients 
necessitate extra effort for the auditor, the research setting allows us to test for auditor 
specialization effects on audit fees. Third, in contrast to Vermeer et al. (2009), we are able to 
test for dependence on public donations as well as governmental funding in a resource 
dependence view on audit. In contrast to Beattie et al. (2001) we draw on a large number of 
nonprofit subsectors in this matter. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section contains an overview of the literature on 
audit fee determinants, followed by hypotheses. The data collection and methodology are 
explained in the following section. Next, the results of the OLS regression are discussed and 
the paper ends with a conclusion and issues for further research.  
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON AUDIT FEE DETERMINANTS 
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There is a large body of literature on audit fee determinants. In general, three main groups of 
determinants can be identified: audit client, auditor and audit engagement characteristics. In 
this brief literature review, we rely heavily on the meta-analysis by Hay et al. (2006), adding 
research results of the period following their analysis and focusing on nonprofit findings.  
 
AUDIT CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS 
The size of the client influences the effort required by the auditor and thus the audit fee. 
Almost all previous studies find a positive relation between client size (measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets, total sales or total staff) and the audit fee (generally 
transformed to its natural logarithm). Overall, size of the client is the most important 
explanatory factor in previous research (Hay et al., 2006, p.164). In the nonprofit sector 
studies, Mellett et al. (2007) and Beattie et al. (2001) found a positive association between 
total revenue of the organization and the level of the audit fee, whereas Vermeer et al. (2009) 
found the same result for total assets as a measure of client size. The complexity of the 
engagement is a second determinant of audit fees. Inventories and debtors have been used as a 
proxy for the extra audit effort required for particular assets. Mellett et al. (2007) and Beattie 
et al. (2001) identified a positive relationship between the importance of inventories (Vermeer 
(2009) used accounts receivables and inventories) in total assets and nonprofit audit fees. 
Some characteristics of the audit client influence the level of the inherent audit risk and 
therefore the effort and price associated with the financial audit. Measures of profitability 
(either a dummy variable for the existence of a loss or the continuous measure of net income 
divided by total assets), leverage (debts divided by total assets) and liquidity (current ratio or 
similar) are applied as measures of audit risk. Overall results on profitability are mixed, which 
according to Hay et al. (2006, p.170) may be due to a nonlinear relationship between loss and 
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risk. In the nonprofit sector, profitability is not significantly linked with audit fees (Mellett et 
al., 2007), whereas leverage is not significantly (Mellett et al., 2007) or positively (Basioudis 
et al., 2005; Vermeer et al., 2009) associated with audit fees. Higher liquidity ratios coincide 
with lower audit fees (Vermeer et al., 2009) as can be expected due to lower risk. 
AUDITOR CHARACTERISTICS 
Typically, two aspects related to the auditor are incorporated in audit fee studies: auditor 
tenure and audit quality (with auditor size and specialization as proxies).  
The BIGN (4,5,6 or 8 depending on the timing of the study) versus Non-BIGN dichotomy 
yields convincing results in favor of a brand name premium (Hay et al., 2006, p.176). In the 
nonprofit studies, Vermeer et al. (2009) also find a positive relationship between BIG4 firms 
and audit fees. Similarly, the UK-studies of Mellett et al. (2007) and Basioudis et al. (2005) 
show that BIGN auditors charge higher fees than second-tier or mid-tier auditors. Beattie et 
al. (2001) do not find a significant difference between BIG6 and Non-BIG6 auditors for 
grantmaking charities, whereas there is a brand name premium for fundraising charities. 
These authors rely on a resource dependence argument: fundraisers need to convince the 
public of their trustworthiness, which may be signalled by the use of a BIG6 auditor. This 
enables BIG6 auditors to make use of a better bargaining position and to charge higher fees. 
The evidence for the effect of auditor specialization on audit fees ismixed. In a market share 
view, a specialist is the audit firm that is the market leader in a sector, or the holder of a large 
market share (above a certain cut-off point relative to market concentration or a continuous 
measure). Whereas Beattie et al. (2001) find some evidence for a Non-BIG6 specialist 
premium, Basioudis et al. (2005) do not find a statistically significant relationship between 
auditor specialization and nonprofit audit fees. An often cited reason to change auditor is to 
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obtain a lower audit fee (see Tate, 2007, for evidence based on nonprofits). Basioudis et al. 
(2005) are the only authors using a tenure variable in the nonprofit studies. They find no 
statistically significant relationship between an auditor switch within the last three years and 
the audit fee. 
 
AUDIT ENGAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
Some characteristics of the audit engagement can be helpful in explaining audit fee levels. 
Audit firms are confronted with seasonal effects in the demand for their services. The ‘busy 
season’ in audit engagements is related to the fact that for the majority of audit clients, the 
end of the accounting period coincides with the end of the calendar year. Hay et al. (2006) 
find mixed evidence on the effect of a busy season audit. In the nonprofit study by Beattie et 
al. (2001), no statistically significant relationship was found. To measure the level of difficulty 
of an audit, two proxies are often used: the existence of an important time lag between the end 
of the accounting period and the date of the audit report (positive relationship with audit fees 
is reported in the meta-analysis by Hay et al. (2006)) and the issuance of an audit opinion that 
is different from unqualified. In previous nonprofit studies (Beattie et al., 2001), the report lag 
was not found to have a statistically significant correlation with audit fees. The type of the 
audit opinion has, to our knowledge, not yet been studied for nonprofit entities. Finally, the 
relationship between the fees for nonaudit services  and audit services has received a great 
deal of attention. According to Hay et al. (2006), the overall relatiosnhip is strongly positive 
and significant. In the nonprofit studies, Beattie et al. (2001) also find a strong positive 
relationship. Basioudis et al. (2005), however, report a (marginally) significant negative 
relationship. 
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The results of previous research are summarized in Table 1. The determinants of audit fees 
are listed in the first column, followed by their expected relationship with audit fees. The 
results of the meta-analysis by Hay et al (2006) are then followed by the results of the 
nonprofit audit fee studies. 
<<< table 1 >>> 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the results and focus of earlier research, we want to address two research questions. 
First, we want to determine whether known determinants of audit fees in the for-profit sector 
are also reflected in nonprofit audit fees. This analysis complements earlier research due to (i) 
the difference between a for-profit and a nonprofit audit (Tate et al., 2007) and (ii) the 
differences in audit market characteristics such as Big4 dominance, litigation risk, client size 
and commercial risk between earlier nonprofit research (in the UK and the US; Beattie et al., 
2001, Mellett et al., 2007 and Vermeer et al., 2009) and the current paper (Belgium).  
Second, we want to investigate whether dependence on government fees is related to audit 
fees. Since Belgian nonprofit organizations are heavily subsidized and the government has 
made financial reporting and financial auditing mandatory, the question arises whether 
subsidization increases audit complexity and demand for audit quality which can both be 
reflected in the audit fee. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
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As in most other studies, we test the effect of the size (brand name) of the auditor on the audit 
fee level. The Belgian audit market is characterized by a moderate market share of the BIG4 
auditors (Van Caneghem, 2010; Weets & Jegers, 1997; Willekens & Achmadi, 2003). 
Furthermore, the traditional view (DeAngelo, 1981) that the difference between BIG4 and 
Non-BIG4 firms captures differences in audit quality , does not seem to hold in Belgium 
(Sercu, Vander Bauwhede, & Willekens, 2002; Vander Bauwhede & Willekens, 2004). 
Therefore, we test the effect of auditor brand name on audit fees using the traditional BIG4 – 
Non-BIG4 dichotomy as well as a distinction between large and small auditors based on their 
number of audit staff (auditor size).  We state that: 
H1. Large audit firms receive audit fee premiums 
The Belgian nonprofit sector has recently undergone legislatory changes that affect 
accounting and reporting practices. Although there is a law that has made accrual accounting 
and external auditing mandatory for all large Belgian nonprofit organizations from 2006 
onwards, heterogeneity still exists due to different sector regulations (Christiaens, Vanhee, 
Verbruggen, & Milis, 2008). This heterogeneity results in ambiguity on the role of the 
external auditor (Verbruggen, Reheul, Van Caneghem, Dierick, Vanhee & Christiaens, 
2011b). Combined with the organizational differences (such as the existence of important 
grants and donations, the absence of shareholders, the presence of volunteers) and the impact 
of these differences on the audit process, the audit of a nonprofit organization may necessitate 
other kinds of competences and experiences with respect to a for-profit organization’s audit. 
Therefore, specialization may be an important factor in the audit fee determination process.  
Research on the link between specialization and audit fee levels has resulted in mixed 
evidence. In former empirical research, the price effect of specialization has shown to be 
negative as well as positive. Experience effects give rise to a decrease in the expense per 
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client and therefore in the audit fee of the client (Cullinan, 1998; Low, 2004). As Cairney and 
Young (2006, p. 50) stipulate: ‘auditor specialization provides a cost-based competitive 
advantage because the cost of developing expertise is spread over more clients’. Furthermore, 
since they are dealing with a new market, auditors may try to gain sufficient market share by 
asking lower audit fees which will enable them to reach experience effects in the future. 
Wang, Sewon and Iqbal (2009) conclude that in the Chinese emerging markets, second tier 
firms developed industry expertise in order to gain economies of scale and reduce service fees 
as a strategy to win future clients looking for low-priced audits. Similarly, we would expect to 
see a negative relationship between specialization and audit fees.  
However, empirical research has also shown (Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995; Cullinan, 
1998; Mayhew & Wilkins, 2003; Ward et al.,1994) that a market specialist is rewarded by a 
fee premium. Clients may be willing to pay more for a specialist that delivers higher audit 
quality (Balsam, Krishnan & Yang, 2003; Krishnan, 2003; Maletta & Cartwright, 1996). This 
may be an important signal to shareholders or, more generally, stakeholders. For example, 
Knechel, Naiker and Pacheco (2007) show that firms switching to a specialist auditor 
experience significant positive abnormal returns. For nonprofits -given the absence of 
shareholders- banks, governments and donors are addressed as sources of revenue and 
funding. The question arises whether nonprofit entities would be interested in paying higher 
fees for a specialist auditor in order to signal quality to these stakeholders. Furthermore, 
Craswell et al. (1995), Casterella, Frances, Lewis and Walker (2004) as well as Carson and 
Fargher (2007) report that the occurrence of fee premiums depends on client size. Since the 
nonprofit sector is often characterized by relatively small organizations when compared to 
for-profit sectors, the likelihood of specialization fee premiums is lower. In conclusion, it 
seems less likely that the degree of willingness of nonprofit organizations to pay a market 
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share specialist premium is as high as that of the listed companies to which most of the former 
research relates. 
Overall, the arguments for specialist price discounts seem stronger than the reasons to pay a 
specialist price premium. We hypothesize that the correlation between specialization and 
audit fees in this new nonprofit market is negative. Therefore, we state that 
H2. The degree of nonprofit sector specialization is negatively related to audit fees. 
Hypothesis 3 deals with resource dependence. Former research on this topic has resulted in 
mixed evidence. Vermeer et al. (2009) find no statistically significant relationship between 
donation income (as a percentage of total income) and audit fees, whereas Beattie et al. (2001) 
show that fundraising nonprofits pay higher audit fees than their grantmaking counterparts. 
Belgian nonprofit organizations are characterized by an important dependence on 
governmental grants and are much less depending on donations. Former research (Verbruggen 
et al., 2011a) has shown that dependence on grants increases compliance with accounting and 
reporting standards. Also, survey data on Belgian nonprofits (Verbruggen et al., 2011b) show 
that 55 percent of the respondents indicate that external auditing of the financial statements is 
useful to justify governmental grants. These respondents also indicate that the financial audit 
performed by an external auditor is different from and complementary to an audit by 
subsidizing governments. Furthermore, from a supply-side view, auditing grants may require 
additional audit effort. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3. Dependence on governmental subsidies is positively related to audit fees. 
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RESEARCH METHOD, DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND DATA COLLECTION 
Our approach to analyzing audit fees is based on OLS regressions, consistent with previous 
research. In all regressions presented in this paper, the dependent variable is the natural log of 
audit fees. The independent variables are described in Table 2 and briefly explained below.  
As in the literature review, we situate the variables in three categories: audit client, audit firm 
and audit engagement characteristics. Characteristics that measure the complexity and risk 
attributed to the client are defined similarly to previous research: total assets (in the natural 
log form, LNTA) and the percentage of inventory and accounts receivable in total assets 
(ARINV) measure the complexity of the client and are expected to be positively related to 
audit fees. Profitability (PROFITAB), leverage (LEVERAGE) and the natural log of the 
current ratio (LNCURRENT) measure the risk associated with the financial situation of the 
audit client. Dependence on subsidies (PERCSUBS) is expected to be positively related to 
audit fees, as explained in hypothesis 3. Donations (DONAT) are added to the model as a 
control variable (Beattie et al.,2001; Vermeer et al., 2009). Due to the extreme skewness of 
this variable (80 percent of organizations do not receive donations), this variable is 
transformed into a dummy variable (one when donations are received, zero otherwise). Other 
dummy variables are added to the model to control for sector-specific characteristics. Six 
subsectors are identified: Culture, sports and recreation (1), education and research (2), health 
care (3), social services (4), advocacy (5) and other (6).  
<<< table 2 >>> 
The characteristics of the auditor are also summarized in Table 2: the influence of brand name 
and auditor size is measured by the BIG4-dummy variable (BIG4) as well as by a continuous 
measure of auditor size (LNSTAFF). The variable LNSTAFF is also expressed as a dummy 
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variable LARGE in which audit firms with LNSTAFF larger than the median value are  
assigned the value one. As such, the variable LARGE captures all BIG4 firms as well as the 
large(st) Non-BIG4 auditors. 
Auditor specialization is measured as the natural log of the number of engagements 
(LN_ENGAG) of the audit firm in the nonprofit sector. This variable captures a market share 
approach to specialization. Since Belgian nonprofit organizations represent a relatively small 
audit market (in 2007, 1748 audits were performed) and the Belgian audit market in general is 
not characterized by a dominance of BIG4 auditors (Willekens & Achmadi, 2003), portfolio 
shares as well as market shares will be relatively low. Therefore, using cut-off values to 
determine which auditor is (and is not) a nonprofit sector specialist can lead to under- or over-
estimation of the degree of specialization. Thus, similar to Beattie et al. (2001) we use a 
continuous instead of a dichotomous variable to measure sector specialization.  
The learning curve is typically expressed as : An=aNb, with An= the effort required to produce 
the last nth unit, a= the effort needed for the production of the first unit, N= the cumulative 
number of units produced and b= the learning exponent. This relationship can also be 
expressed as LN(An) = LN(a)+bLN(N). Therefore, the number of engagements is transformed 
into its natural log. Usually, the slope of the learning curve (b) is interpreted as the constant 
percentage decrease in effort every time output is doubled.  
 Audit complexity has been measured in previous research by the time gap between the end of 
the accounting year and the date of the audit report (DELAY) and the type of auditors’ report. 
A late auditors’ report or a report that is anything other than unqualified, is a proxy for a 
difficult audit process. In this paper, the dummy variable UNQUALIFIED takes the value one 
when the report is unqualified. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship with the audit fee.  
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All Belgian audit firms need to report audit fees, number of staff and number of billed hours 
to the Institute of Auditors (IBR, Instituut van de Bedrijfsrevisoren). At the time of the data 
collection, data for 2006 and 2007 were available, as well as the majority of data for 2008. In 
these data, nonprofit clients were identified. In the three-year period for which data are 
available, the number of missing data was at a minimum in 2007. Therefore, data for that year 
are used in the analysis. When data for 2007 were missing in the auditors’ report to the 
Institute, the most recent available data (2008 or 2006) were used.  
In 2007, the auditors reported 1,748 nonprofit audit engagements. The financial and sector 
data for the audited organizations were retrieved from the BELFIRST database and provided 
by the National Bank of Belgium. For 382 organizations, the audit fee was not reported and 
for 11 organizations the sector could not be determined. In 462 cases, the financial statements 
did not allow to calculate dependence on subsidies or donations, reducing the number of 
usable cases to 893. Thereof, 151 (16.9 percent) were audited by a BIG4 auditor, 742 (83.1 
percent) by a non-BIG4 auditor. In 146 cases, the auditor’s report was not made public and in 
7 cases we did not have sufficient data to determine the auditor characteristics. This reduced 
the number of usable cases to 740. An overview of the number of cases is presented in Table 
3. 
<<< table 3 >>> 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables used in the audit fee models are reported in 
Table 4. Profitability, leverage and delay were winsorized to mitigate the disturbing effects of 
outliers in the regression analysis. The current ratio was transformed to its natural log to deal 
with a high level of skewness. The average audit fee is 5 257.74 euro. The average total assets 
of the audit clients is 17.8 million euro, but the distribution is heavily skewed as evidenced by 
the value of percentile 75. The average audit client has a leverage of 49 percent and profit is 
three percent of total assets. Dependence on subsidies ranges from zero to 100 percent, with 
an average of 33 percent. Dependence on donations (not tabulated) is only 1% on average and 
80 percent of organizations do not receive donations. The auditor characteristics in Table 4 
are based on the number of audit engagements. Therefore, an audit firm performing 20 audits 
in the sample of 740 organizations will be taken into consideration as many times in this 
table. 
<<< table 4 >>> 
The descriptives per audit firm are presented in Table 5. The data are shown for all audit firms 
as well as for BIG4 and Non-BIG4 firms separately. The number of audit engagements (not 
tabulated) in the sample varies from one to 61 in Non-BIG4 audit firms and from 11 to 129 
for the BIG4 audit firms. The mean percentage of nonprofit audit fees in total audit fees (not 
tabulated) is 8.87 percent and 0.12 percent for Non-BIG4 and BIG4 respectively. Overall, the 
data suggest large differences between BIG4 and Non-BIG4 firms.  
<<<  table 5 >>> 
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BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Spearman correlation coefficients are shown in Table 6. When analyzing the bivariate 
correlation between the audit fee (natural log) and the characteristics of the audit client and 
the audit engagement, we notice that the correlation with total assets (natural log), the size of 
the auditor (dichotomous as well as continuous) and the health care sector (sector 3) as well as 
the sector 6 (which is the most business-like nonprofit subsector) are high and positive. On 
the other hand, the subsector of education and research (sector 2) seems to pay lower audit 
fees. In line with our expectations, the correlation between an unqualified report and the audit 
fee is negative. Contrary to our expectations, the correlation between dependence on subsidies 
and the audit fee is negative when we do not control for other factors (most importantly the 
sector). LN_ENGAG also shows a different correlation than expected which may be 
explained by auditor size.When analyzing the characteristics of the auditor, it becomes 
obvious that there are very high correlations between the size (BIG4/LNSTAFF/LARGE) and 
specialization (LN_ENGAG) of the auditor. Therefore, separate regressions for different size 
proxies of auditors may be necessary to fully understand auditor size and specialization 
effects. 
<<<  table 6 >>> 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES 
The following OLS model is tested in different subsamples (with SIZE defined as BIG4, 
LARGE or LNSTAFF): 
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In model 1a, 1b and 1c, the sample consists of all auditors and different measures of size are 
tested to determine whether size or brand name of the auditor affect audit fees. In models 2a, 
2b and 2c, different subsamples of 2 categories of auditors are used (BIG4 and Large Non-
BIG4, Large Non-BIG4 and small Non-BIG4, BIG4 and small Non-BIG4) which allows us to 
compare auditors two by two. In the last two models, only non-BIG4 auditors are used. 
 
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 7. The adjusted R² of the different 
models ranges from .327 to .461, which is satisfactory but lower than in similar for-profit 
firms research. The results show strong support for hypothesis 1. BIG4 auditors charge higher 
fees than Non-BIG4 auditors (model 1a), large Non-BIG4 auditors (model 2a) and small Non-
BIG4 auditors (model 2c). However, this is not merely a brand name effect. The actual size of 
the auditor results in higher fees as is made clear by the significantly positive coefficients for 
the variable LARGE (capturing BIG4 as well as Non-BIG4 auditors) in models 1b and 2b as 
well as for the continuous variable LNSTAFF in model 1c and 3b. Only in the subsample of 
large Non-BIG4 auditors, size is not significantly correlated with audit fees. 
 
Overall, the results strongly support the second hypothesis that nonprofit sector specialization 
is negatively related to audit fees. In all models, the coefficient of the variable LN_ENGAG is 
negative and significant. Whether this is the result of lowballing or experience effects cannot 
be determined in the current research setting. If the coefficient of LN_ENGAG is capturing a 
learning or experience effect, the learning curve involved ranges from 85 to 97 percent 
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(depending on the type of auditor). The coefficient ‘b12’ is the result of log r/log 2, with r= the 
learning rate. In this case, log 0,85/log 2 is approximately -0.23, the coefficient of 
LN_ENGAG in model 2a. A learning rate of 85 percent indicates that the price of the last unit 
is 85 percent of the price of the first unit every time production is doubled. However, some 
caution is needed when interpreting these results. First, the experience curve is usually 
expressed in terms of the cost of production. Since audit price does not fully reflect audit cost, 
the former may be a crude proxy of the cost depending on how strongly cost reductions are 
reflected in price reductions. Second, as explained before, we cannot determine whether the 
negative coefficient of LN_ENGAG is the consequence of lowballing or experience.  
 
Client characteristics were tested in all models. Complexity of the client is positively 
associated with the level of the audit fee: total assets (natural log) as well as the percentage of 
accounts receivable and inventory in total assets have consistent and highly significant 
coefficients in all models. When assessing audit risk, we conclude that leverage nor liquidity 
help to explain audit fee levels. Contrary to theoretical expectations and previous nonprofit 
research results, profitability is (marginally) significantly and positively associated with the 
audit fee. This effect seems to be driven by the smaller auditors (profitability is not significant 
when the sample only consists of larger auditors). Whereas Hay et al. (2006) suggest that 
mixed results may be due to a non-linear relationship, our results suggest that market 
characteristics may (also) drive the relationship. A nonprofit organization is allowed to report 
a profit, but is not expected to. Therefore, the existence of profit may reflect an ‘ability to 
pay’ higher audit fees or a lower price elasticity in more profitable organizations. The 
difference between the results of the current study and previous research as well as the 
difference between larger and smaller auditors in the current study can help identify the 
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conditions under which the ‘ability to pay’ signal leads to increased audit fees. First, the audit 
risk environment (litigation and commercial risk) needs to be taken into consideration. When 
risk is low, profitability is less important in assessing audit risk and audit effort which gives 
room to ability to pay effects. Second, the market characteristics define the bargaining power 
of both parties. In a nonprofit market where audit is mandatory but the choice of the auditor is 
at the discretion of the client, pressure on prices will be high. Since we do not observe the 
positive relationship between profitability and audit fees for larger auditors, this may indicate 
that these auditors have sufficient bargaining power to be able to charge ‘standard’ fees which 
makes the ability to pay less important. In none of the models, dependence on subsidies (and 
donations) is significant in explaining audit fees. Therefore, the results do not support our 
third hypothesis. The delay of the audit report is not significant, whereas the type of audit 
report is highly significant in 6 of the 8 models, in the expected direction.  
<<< table 7 >>> 
In sum, the data on Belgian nonprofit organizations largely support a price premium for large 
auditors and a price reduction for nonprofit sector specialists. The audit fee does not seem to 
be driven by resource dependence.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
In this paper we analyze nonprofit audit fees in a market where (i) the BIG4 auditors are not 
strongly dominant, (ii) clients as well as auditors are relatively inexperienced with the audit 
process in a nonprofit setting, (iii) the market is recently reformed, small and developing. 
Since there is only a limited number of studies on audit fees in the nonprofit sector, the 
current paper extends previous research on two important dimensions.  
First, we tested whether or not known determinants of audit fees identified in previous 
(mostly for-profit sector) research are also reflected in nonprofit organisations’ audit fees.   
Measures of client complexity are highly important in explaining audit fees and comparable 
to for-profit studies, suggesting that auditors duplicate knowledge on for-profit audit 
complexity in nonprofit audit fees. Measures of audit risk, however, are not used in the same 
manner. Liquidity and leverage are insignificant in explaining audit fees. We need to take into 
consideration that (i) the litigation risk and commercial risk is quite low when auditing a 
(small) nonprofit organization, (ii) this is even more so the case in Belgium, where litigation 
risk is traditionally lower than in e.g. the US or the UK.  
The relationship between audit fee and profitability is positive for smaller auditors. This 
result, which prima facie is unexpected and opposite to theoretical expectations, can help to 
shed light on previously mixed results reported by Hay et al. (2006) and is consistent with an 
‘ability to pay effect’ and differences in auditors’ bargaining power. In contrast to earlier 
studies but in line with theoretical expectations, an unqualified audit report is negatively 
related to audit fees. Follow-up research can look into this effect by analyzing whether or not 
this variable remains significant when the audit market becomes more mature and clients as 
well as auditors get more experienced. 
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The test of auditor characteristics shows that, similar to previous research, larger auditors 
charge higher fees. The size of the auditor does not necessarily need to be reduced to a 
dichotomous Big4 versus Non-Big4 variable.  
Auditor specialization is negatively associated with lower audit fees. The signaling effect of 
hiring a specialist auditor may be smaller for nonprofit organizations due to the absence of 
stockholders. Therefore, the willingness to pay higher fees for a specialist will also be lower. 
From a supply-side view, since this is a newly established market, learning effects may play 
an important role and drive fees downwards. On the other hand, the negative relationship 
between the number of audits and the fees may also be caused by lowballing in a price-
conscious market.  
Second, the effect of resource dependence (tested previously by Beattie et al. (2001) and 
Vermeer et al. (2009)) is tested in an environment where governmental grants are an 
important source of revenue. Contrary to our expectations, the percentage of subsidies is not 
significantly correlated with audit fees. Several explanations are possible: (i) the government 
does not pay attention to financial audit information in the procurement process of subsidies, 
(ii) subsidies do not increase the audit effort, (iii) subsidies are audited by governmental 
auditors, not by financial auditors, (iv) audit clients are not convinced that higher quality 
audits are important in receiving/justifying subsidies. 
The current paper extends knowledge on nonprofit audit fees and is important to practice as 
well. Overall, the results show that the audit fee model of a nonprofit organization differs 
from a for-profit client due to the characteristics of the client and the audit market. Lower 
litigation and/or commercial risk, the absence of shareholders which induces lower agency 
problems and signaling effects are possible explanations for differences in the audit fee 
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determinants. Dependence on governmental subsidies, a key difference in the financing of 
for-profits and nonprofits is not significant in explaining audit fee levels.  
The relatively low explanatory power of the audit fee models indicates that further research is 
needed to better explain nonprofit audit fees. A comparison with for-profit audit fees in a 
similar market may further help to clarify differences. Furthermore, future analysis of audit 
fees may help to distinguish lowballing from experience curve effects.  
The results of the current study are important to audit clients  as well as auditors. They need 
to be aware of the difference in pricing between smaller and larger auditors, between 
specialists and non-specialists and the effect of profitability on the fee level. Given the fact 
that previous Belgian research (Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2004) did not identify 
differences in quality between large and smaller audit firms, this information is relevant in 
their pricing and auditor choice decision.  
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TABLE 1. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FORMER RESEARCH ON THE 
DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES.  
Determinant Expect. Meta-analysis 
by Hay et al. 
(2006) 
Nonprofit studies 
Basioudis et al. (2005) 
Beattie et al. (2001) 
Mellett et al. (2007) 
Vermeer et al. (2009) 
Audit client    
Size  + + + 
Complexity: Inventories/debtors + 
 
+ + 
Audit risk:  
Profitability 
Leverage 
Liquidity 
Internal control 
Governance 
 
Resource dependence: 
fundraising (1) versus grantmaking (0) 
donation income 
trading income 
 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
? 
 
Mixed 
+ 
- 
Mixed 
Mixed 
 
NS 
+  and NS 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
 
+ 
NS 
+ and NS 
Auditor    
Audit quality: 
Big’N’ auditor 
 
 
 
 
Specialization 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
mixed 
 
Evidence in support of 
a Big’N’ premium 
Weak support for 
NonBig ‘N’ specialist 
premium or non-
significant results 
 
Auditor tenure 
Expensive (metropolitan) location 
 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
 
NS 
+ 
Audit engagement    
Busy season + mixed NS 
Report lag + + NS 
Opinion (other than qualified) + ‘less important’ NS 
Non-audit services ? + mixed 
Positive (negative) relationships are marked with ‘+’ (‘-‘), whereas statistically insignificant relationships are marked ‘NS’ 
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TABLE 2. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
Determinant Hypoth. 
/Control 
Definition  Expectation 
Audit client    
LNTA C Natural log of total assets  + 
ARINV C (Accounts receivable+ inventory)/Total assets + 
PROFITAB 
LEVERAGE 
LNCURRENT 
PERCSUBS 
DONAT 
 
SECTOR 
C 
C 
C 
H3 
C 
 
C 
Net profit of the period/Total assets 
Total debt/Total assets 
Current assets/Current liabilities (nat.log) 
Grants/total operating revenue 
Dummy variable to indicate the presence of 
donations 
Dummy variables to indicate the subsector to which 
the nonprofit organization belongs 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
? 
 
? 
Auditor    
BIG4 H1 Dummy variable: 1 when the auditor is a Big 4 firm, 
0 otherwise 
+ 
LNSTAFF H1 Natural log of the number of audit staff (expressed 
in full time equivalents) of the audit firm 
+ 
LARGE H1 Dummy variable: 1 when LNSTAFF of the auditor 
is larger than the median value, zero otherwise 
+ 
LN_ENGAG H2 Natural log of the number of audit engagements in 
the nonprofit sector 
- 
    
    
Audit engagement    
DELAY C Number of days between end of the accounting 
period and date of the audit report 
+ 
UNQUALIFIED C Dummy variable: 1 when unqualified auditors’ 
report, 0 otherwise 
- 
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TABLE 3. NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
 Total BIG4 Non-BIG4 
Total number of audits 1748 284 
(16.2%) 
1464 
(83.8%) 
-Fee unknown -382 - 38 - 344 
- Sector unknown -11 - 1 - 10 
-missing data financial statements -462 - 94 - 368 
Number  
(client characteristics) 
893 151  742  
-missing data on audit engagement 
(unqualified/delay) 
-146 -40 -106 
-missing data on auditor 
characteristics 
-7 -0 -7 
Number 
(client/auditor/engagement) 
 740 111 
(15.0%) 
629  
(85.0%) 
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TABLE 4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON CONTINUOUS VARIABLES  
 
M
in
. 
M
a
x.
 
P
e
rc
2
5
 
P
e
rc
7
5
 
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
.d
e
v
. 
S
k
e
w
n
e
ss
 
K
u
rt
o
si
s 
FEE 471.00 100150.00 2150.00 5671.75 5257.74 3302.50 6.21 65.37 
LNFEE 6.15 11.51 7.67 8.64 8.21 .77 .64 .82 
TA (000) 8.4 1235708 2208.04 11774.21 17790.75 6059.92 13.14 234.29 
LNTA 9.03 20.93 14.61 16.28 15.48 1.47 .046 .97 
ARINV .00 .99 .068 .29 .21 .20 1.58 2.24 
LEVERAGE 
wins.1% 
.03 1.24 .27 .67 .49 .27 .484 -.371 
PROFITAB. 
Wins.5% 
-.06 .15 .0052 .061 .0356 .05 .48 .204 
LNCURRENT -1.71 6.72 .309 1.29 .91 .93 1.50 5.48 
PERCSUBS .00 1.00 .006 .83 .46 .37 -.019 -1.56 
DELAY 
Wins.1% 
57 261 113 157 135.53 34.96 .13 1.20 
LNSTAFF .00 6.17 1.04 3.32 2.51 1.83 .71 -.51 
LN_ENGAG .00 4.86 2.08 3.99 2.98 1.19 -.43 -.48 
TA is total assets, expressed in thousands of euros. LNTA is the natural logarithm of TA. ARINV is the sum of 
accounts receivable and inventories divided by total assets. LEVERAGE is total debts divided by total assets. 
PROFITAB is net profit divided by total assets. LNCURRENT is the natural logarithm of current assets divided 
by current liabilities. PERCSUBS is grants divided by operating revenue. DELAY is the number of days between 
the end of the accounting period and the date of the audit report. LNSTAFF is the natural log of the number 
of audit staff (expressed as full time equivalents) of the audit firm. LN_ENGAG is the natural log of the 
number of audit engagements of the audit firm in the nonprofit sector. 
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TABLE 5CHARACTERISTICS OF AUDIT FIRMS  
 
M
in
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M
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K
u
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s 
LNSTAFF 
BIG4 (n=4) 
Non-BIG4 (n=130) 
 
5.69 
.00 
 
6.17 
4.55 
 
5.97 
1.24 
 
.22 
1.01 
 
-.61 
.84 
 
-2.41 
.26 
LN_ENGAG 
BIG4 
Non-BIG4 
 
2.40 
.00 
 
4.86 
4.11 
 
3.95 
1.61 
 
1.08 
1.61 
 
-1.54 
.24 
 
2.72 
-.53 
LNSTAFF is the natural log of the number of audit staff (expressed as full time equivalents) of the audit firm. 
LN_ENGAG is the natural log of the number of audit engagements of the audit firm in the nonprofit sector. 
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TABLE 6. SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (definition of variables in table 2) 
 
L
N
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E
E
 
L
N
T
A
 
A
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I
N
V
 
P
R
I
O
F
I
T
A
B
 
L
E
V
E
R
A
G
E
 
L
N
C
U
R
R
E
N
T
 
P
E
R
C
S
U
B
S
 
D
O
N
A
T
 
S
E
C
T
1
 
S
E
C
T
2
 
S
E
C
T
3
 
S
E
C
T
4
 
S
E
C
T
5
 
S
E
C
T
6
 
B
I
G
4
 
L
N
S
T
A
F
F
 
L
A
R
G
E
 
L
N
E
N
G
A
G
 
D
E
L
A
Y
 
LNTA .537 1                  
ARINV .041 -.221 1                 
PROFITAB -.040 -.131 .049 1                
LEVERAGE .001 -.132 .306 -.188 1               
LNCURR -.010 .060 -.314 .265 -.646 1              
PERCSUBS -.197 -.184 -.095 .049 -.014 .124 1             
DONAT .024 .026 -.124 -.079 -.055 .058 .213 1            
SECT1 -.016 -.091 .041 -.074 .021 -.030 -.070 -.048 1           
SECT2 -.214 -.071 -.182 .112 -.006 .198 .494 -.001 -.125 1          
SECT3 .273 .292 .209 -.019 .056 -.032 -.081 -.106 -.054 -.220 1         
SECT4 -.041 -.105 .032 -.081 -.118 -.151 -.178 .221 -.132 -.540 -.232 1        
SECT5 -.037 -.050 -.018 .046 -.063 .070 -.064 -.068 -.051 -.207 -.089 -.218 1       
SECT6 .158 .049 .041 -.003 .167 -.066 -.294 -.146 -.055 -.226 -.097 -.238 -.091 1      
BIG4 .194 .184 .042 -.041 .072 -.087 -.102 -.059 -.029 -.085 .059 -.104 .049 .171 1     
LNSTAFF .285 .230 .092 -.029 .029 -.083 -.160 -.053 -.065 -.091 .059 -.089 .061 .173 .620 1    
LARGE .262 .180 .091 -.021 .058 -.068 -.115 -.020 -.076 -0.63 .076 -.085 .036 .144 .393 .866 1   
LN_ENGAG .060 .089 .086 -.012 .093 -.053 .005 -.043 -.098 .017 .017 -.138 .046 .096 .592 .729 .694 1  
DELAY .052 .050 .068 -.084 .096 -.083 -.040 -.029 -.117 .087 .087 -.018 -.148 .079 .106 .146 .148 .156 1 
UNQUAL -.146 -.082 -.069 .059 -.158 .131 .035 .005 .057 -.211 -.211 .065 .020 -.062 .045 -.029 -.032 .039 -.135 
(two-s ided,  s ignif icant corre lations  at 5% level  are  bolded)  
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TABLE 7. OLS REGRESSION RESULTS 
SAMPLE ALL 
auditors 
ALL 
auditors 
ALL 
auditors 
LARGE 
auditors 
NONB4 
auditors 
B4 and 
small 
auditors 
LARGE 
NONB4 
auditors 
SMALL 
auditors 
Variables Expect. Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 3a Model 3b 
CONSTANT  3.443 *** 3.444 *** 3.602 *** 3.886 *** 4.034 *** 3.674 *** 4.257 *** 4.218 *** 
LNTA + .304 *** .302 *** .289 *** .324 *** .272 *** .289 *** .292 *** .248 *** 
ARINV + .479 *** .457 *** .436 *** .417 ** .483 *** .448 ** .454 ** .447 ** 
LEVERAGE + .025  .055  .077  .090  .010  .068  .078  -.023  
PROFITAB. - .841 * .799 * .839 * .128  .821 * 1.335 ** .006  1.576 ** 
LNCURRENT - .010  .010  .017  .017  .001  .035  -.006  -.004  
PERCSUBS + -.012  .011  .027  -.040  .038  .017  .034  .080  
DONAT  .070  .053  .069  .414 * .041  .026  .115  -.010  
SECTOR1  .344 ** .360 ** .322 ** .262  .247 * .449 ** .007  .346 ** 
SECTOR3  .282 ** .271 ** .284 ** .276 ** .211 ** .307 ** .190  .271 * 
SECTOR4  .098  .092  .079  .115  .058  .121  .056  .094  
SECTOR5  .155 * .159 * .133  .092  .150  .161  .128  .198  
SECTOR6  .314 ** .311 ** .272 ** .350 ** .199 * .227 * .329 ** -.008  
DELAY - .000  .000  .000  -.001  .000  .000  -.001  .001  
UNQUALIFIED - -.143 ** -.110 * -.120 ** -.052  -.130 ** -.189 ** -.045  -.180 ** 
BIG4 + .311 ***     .374 ***   .649 ***     
LARGE +   .362 ***     .360 ***       
LNSTAFF +     .122 ***       .046  .097 * 
LN_ENGAG  -.040 * -.093 *** -.126 *** -.229 *** -.132 *** -.125 *** -.224 *** -.127 *** 
R²Adj.  .413  .427  .434  .461  .390  .449  .400  .327  
F   33.43 *** 35.49 *** 36.47 *** 22.04 *** 26.05 *** 24.17 *** 12.78 *** 11.45 *** 
Max VIF  1.944  1.947  2.393  1.903  1.942  2.685  1.997  2.101  
N  740  740  740  395  629  456  284  345  
Definition of variables in Table 2. Significance at 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.001 (***) levels
33 
 
 
